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6 November, 2012 
The power of war gaming has been a critical part of US military studies and planning throughout 
the years.  It has evolved into significant efforts such as the Title 10 war games like the Navy’s 
Global series and the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Warrior series.  These games dive into issues 
of utmost concern to the individual services to provide data and enlighten a way forward for the 
services along a myriad of topics.  Yet, as a Naval Service, we have a responsibility to ensure we 
jointly study issues of concern to both our Services.  
This summer, at the behest of the newly formed Naval Board, the staffs of the War Gaming 
Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and Wargaming Division of the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia integrated to conduct the first Navy-
Marine Corps war game since the SECNAV Wargame in 1994.  In so doing the staff of the 
Naval Services Game (NSG-12) succeeded in proving the utility of gaming to explore issues of 
concern to the naval services. 
By artfully limiting the scope of the game in order to fit an abbreviated timeline, the team 
conducted a game that included Navy and Marine Corps leaders and subject matter experts from 
across the warfighting spectrum to aid in defining the problems of naval force aggregation.  As a 
result of this game’s success future events can more deeply explore the details and potential 
solutions in order to bridge the existing gaps in command and control, staff construct, doctrine 
and training. 
This report is hopefully the first of many efforts by our organizations to work together in the 
interest of furthering the mutual goals of our services. 
 
   
Rear Admiral John N. Christenson, USN  Brigadier General Mark R. Wise, USMC 
President  Commanding General 
U.S. Naval War College  Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
Newport, Rhode Island  Quantico, Virginia    
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October 22, 2012 
From 11-13 September 2012, the War Gaming Department of the United States Naval War 
College (NWC) in collaboration with the Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL), hosted the 2012 Naval Services Game (NSG). The Naval Board directed 
both the War Gaming Department and the Wargaming Division to develop and execute a “proof 
of concept” Navy/Marine Corps wargame that would permit the examination of issues of 
concern to both services. The determination was made to explore the problems associated with 
aggregating naval forces in response to an emerging conflict. 
The ensuing analytic report was prepared by a core team of research faculty and professional 
analysts from both of these institutions.  The findings in this report reflect the observations, 
insights, and recommendations that were garnered from participants during game play. 
Moreover, this report reflects the use of a wide range of research methods and tools designed 
to elicit intellectually honest analysis of complex problems. 
For additional information please contact the Chairman, War Gaming Department, Naval 
War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI  02841 or via electronic mail at 
wargaming@usnwc.edu.   
 
   
 Prof. David A. DellaVolpe  Dr. William Lademan 
 Chairman  Director 
 War Gaming Department  Wargaming Divison 
 U.S. Naval War College  Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Overview, Objective & Research Questions 
The United States Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, in partnership with the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), hosted the Naval Services Game (NSG) from 
11-13 September 2012. The NSG was developed and executed under the sponsorship of the 
Naval Board. The purpose of the NSG was to explore the challenges associated with aggregating 
naval forces in response to an emerging conflict. 
Specifically, the following objective was identified for this project: 
Develop principles and identify potential gaps that result from the aggregation of naval forces 
beyond the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Carrier 
Strike Group (CSG). 
Based on the Naval Board’s interest in force aggregation, and after performing a review of 
related literature, the NWC’s War Gaming Department (WGD) and the MCWL Wargaming 
Division (WGD) jointly developed the following overarching research questions: 
 As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force structure?  
What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF? 
 
 Relative to the following areas, (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace 
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will 
command arrangements evolve? 
 
 What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces outside of typical 
organizational structures?   
Game Structure  
The NSG was a one-sided, professionally facilitated, seminar event. It consisted of three, 
unclassified, time-stepped vignettes, each of which expanded upon the aggregation of BLUE 
forces in the maritime environment. The vignettes featured a notional scenario using real world 
geography. A simulated conflict between the countries of GREEN and RED in 2014 served as 
the initial condition. The participants were placed into one of two BLUE cells. BLUE Cell A was 
comprised predominately of operators, whereas BLUE Cell B was staffed primarily with experts 
in support establishment. Both cells were playing from the perspective of the Service Component 
Commander during vignette 1, and from vantage point of the Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commander during vignettes 2 and 3. The WHITE cell (also referred to as the Control cell), was 
comprised of NWC WGD and MCWL WGD staff who served as the Combatant Commander 
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during vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force Commander during vignettes 
2 and 3. 
During each of the three vignettes, each BLUE cell was required to collectively produce a 
Course of Action (COA) sketch, complete individual Web-IQ surveys, engage in cell-based 
facilitated seminar discussions captured by members of the control team, and provide content to 
Web-IQ threaded discussions captured electronically, which emphasized the gaps, principles and 
insights associated with naval force aggregation. 
On the final day, players participated in a combined plenary session where they presented the 
COAs developed during each vignette and discussed the gaps, principles and insights identified 
during gameplay. Senior naval services leaders, such as RADM John Christenson (NWC), BGen 
Mark Wise (MCWL), RDML Ann Phillips (ESG-2), and CAPT Michael Napolitano, 
representing RADM Michael Tillotson (NECC), were also present during this session and their 
insights were captured for inclusion in post-game analysis. 
Summary of Participants 
Thirty-five members of the United States Navy (USN) and Marine Corps (USMC), representing 
officer pay grades O-4 through O-6 served as players in the NSG. Players averaged 21 years of 
service per participant, including nearly 7 years of experience at the battalion/command level. 
Players were highly educated, with 69 percent of participants holding a master’s degree or 
higher. With respect to warfare specialties, 34 percent served in the surface/submarine warfare 
community, 29 percent of participants were from Navy and Marine aviation, 14 percent were 
USMC ground combat experts, 14 percent served in the intelligence/information dominance 
community, and 9 percent belonged to the USMC logistics military occupational specialty 
(0402). Both BLUE Cell A and Cell B were comparably matched in terms of players’ education 
and expertise. 
Summary of Analysis  
Data were captured through a variety of techniques including cell-generated COAs, individual 
player surveys, facilitated discussion, and threaded thematic sessions. The Data Collection and 
Analysis Team (DCAT) subsequently employed several qualitative analytical techniques in order 
to examine these data streams, ultimately yielding the following responses to the Naval Services 
Game’s research questions: 
Question #1: As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force structure?  
What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF? 
Response: Overwhelmingly, players in both cells emphasized the importance of cultivating 
command relationships. These relationships were defined as personal, structural, organizational, 
formal and informal, and were deemed a precursor to effective force aggregation. Specifically, 
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fostering organizational unity of command and developing a simplified command and control 
(C2) element through the use of integrated staffs were also identified as essential preparatory 
steps prior to engaging in a combined Navy-Marine Corps fight. Further analysis into doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) 
revealed that the elements of doctrine, organization, leadership, and training manifest the greatest 
gaps in present-day Navy-Marine Corps joint operations. 
Question #2: Relative to the following areas (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace 
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will command 
arrangements evolve? 
Response: Game participants identified lack of service culture awareness and diminished 
understanding of cross-domain resources as the greatest challenges to combined Navy-Marine 
Corps force aggregation. Specifically, Navy personnel did not fully comprehend amphibious 
operations, whereas Marine Corps participants acknowledged only cursory familiarity with 
maritime operations. This lack of fluency between the services presented the greatest challenge 
for players when planning viable courses of action for combined operations in the littorals. 
Moreover, because the composition and functionality of staffs are presently bifurcated towards 
either maritime or land operations, mission planning, and task and battlespace organization  
continue to challenge the commander engaged in combined Navy-Marine Corps operations.  
Question #3: What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces outside of 
typical organizational structures?   
Due to the finite time constraints imposed upon game play (i.e., three vignettes over less than 
two days of game play), participants in the 2012 Naval Services Game opted to focus on the 
gaps, principles, and issues germane to force aggregation rather than delve into alternate 
perspectives on atypical organizational structures. However, data garnered from both cells 
suggests that regardless of organizational structure considered, greater emphasis needs to be 
placed on cultivating command relationships, and simplifying and unifying command and 
control structures.  
During the course of game play, the participants were asked to identify any potential gaps and 
propose principles based on the difficulties they faced in aggregating naval forces. Both BLUE A 
and B cell participants were expected to focus on naval force aggregation issues and the 
evolution of command relationships throughout game play.  
 
On the final day of the NSG, BLUE cells A and B participated in a combined plenary session 
that allowed them to present the COAs developed during each of the three vignettes, and to 
discuss the gaps, principles, and insights garnered by the players. The following gaps and 
principles were identified by either BLUE cell A or BLUE cell B, but not necessarily by both, 
and not in prioritized order. 
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Participant Identified Principles of Aggregation 
 Naval staffs organized and manned by permanent and appropriately skilled Navy and 
Marine staff officers in each functional area provide full command and control of the 
naval battle, and facilitate force integration. 
 
 Integrated operational planning facilitates coordination, seamless operations, and ensures 
desired operational tempo. 
 
 Continuity of Command and effective C2 is maintained by staff organization that 
accounts for changes in force structure as the mission evolves. 
 
 Interoperability of systems and TTPs, and common operational terminology enables 
seamless aggregation. 
 
 Common Training and Education in Naval warfare facilitate aggregation. 
 
Participant Identified Gaps Affecting Aggregation 
 Insufficient doctrine to guide battlespace organization, staff organization, integrated 
logistics, and seamlessly synchronized operations across littoral, surface, subsurface and 
air. 
 
 MOCs and other naval staffs are not integrated, organized and manned with appropriate 
expertise and service composition to enable integrated maritime operations. 
 
 Limited common training (Navy/Marine Corps) of personnel, staffs, and leaders that 
build experience with aggregation and cross service understanding of requirements and 
capabilities. 
 
 Operational logistics lacks doctrine, organization, training and systems to integrate across 
service and functional areas with the speed, flexibility and scope required aggregation. 
 
 Current equipment and systems lacks the interoperability required for flexible and 
integrated operations. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study 
The 2012 Naval Services Game brought together warfighters from the USN and USMC in order 
to explore issues germane to force aggregation in combined operations. Despite the differences 
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in the composition of BLUE cells A and B, findings between the two cells were nearly identical. 
Indeed, game findings collectively highlighted the cultural differences between both services and 
the need to enhance command relationships—ultimately yielding more integrated and efficient 
command and control structures. Analysis further suggests that aggregating forces for operations 
conducted in the littorals presents the greatest challenges for Navy-Marine Corps missions.  
Additional efforts to cultivate command relationships should be undertaken including, but not 
limited to conducting additional games focused on inter-cultural awareness and the continued 
refinement of principles and gaps through analysis; developing and exercising C2 integrated 
staffing models; and formulating doctrine to address aggregation and provide guidance to gap 
closure. Moreover, the development of a 2013 Naval Services Game to continue exploring Navy 
and Marine Corps operations is recommended. Lastly, the Naval Warfare Group should be 
consulted to distill other tangible actions for future decision/direction.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of Sponsor’s Interest in this Topic 
According to the Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower, “the speed, flexibility, agility 
and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of 
options for responding to crises (2007, p. 8)”. However, such benefits can only be garnered if the 
maritime services, especially the warfighting-focused Navy and Marine Corps have a holistic 
appreciation beyond their own strengths to include the capabilities and equities of their sister 
services. 
Towards this end, in the spring of 2012, the Naval Board tasked the United States Naval War 
College’s War Gaming Department (NWC WGD) and the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory’s Wargaming Division (MCWL WGD) with cooperatively developing a game that 
would explore the gaps, issues, and principles germane to the aggregation of Navy and Marine 
forces at the operational level of war. The project was subsequently termed as the 2012 Naval 
Services Game (NSG). 
The purpose of this report is to discuss the NSG, including the game’s objectives and research 
questions, design, and participants. In addition to these descriptive elements, this Report will also 
summarize and analyze player findings and insights, especially as they pertain to the gaps and 
principles associated with combined Navy-Marine Corps force aggregation at the operational 
level. Lastly, concluding comments will be stated.   
B. Game Purpose and Objective 
The purpose of the NSG was to explore the challenges associated with aggregating naval forces 
in response to an emerging conflict. Specifically, the following objective was identified for this 
project: 
Develop principles and identify potential gaps that result from the aggregation of naval forces 
beyond the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Carrier 
Strike Group (CSG). 
C. Overarching Research Questions 
Based on the Naval Board’s interest in force aggregation, and after performing a review of 
related literature, the NWC WGD and MCWL WGD jointly developed the following three 
research questions: 
Research Question #1: As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force 
structure?  What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF? 
Naval Services Game 
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Research Question #2: Relative to the following areas (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace 
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will command 
arrangements evolve? 
Research Question #3: What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces 
outside of typical organizational structures?   
D. Identification of Independent, Dependent, and Moderator Variables 
In order to objectively conduct research into the relationship between force structure and 
aggregation and its gaps and implications, the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) 
identified both the independent variables (i.e., those items that can be manipulated by the 
researchers for the purpose of conducting the study) and dependent variables (resultants).  
Moreover, the relationship of these two variables to a third variable, referred to in social sciences 
research as a moderator variable, was also included. 
 
Identifying the independent and dependent variables was important, because it established the 
parameters that would be studied in the 2012 Naval Services Game. By bounding game design 
around the independent variable (naval force aggregation) as it pertains to the dependent 
variables (implications, gaps, and the evolution of other command relationships), analysts were 
able to focus their research efforts on the objective promulgated by the Naval Board. Moreover, 
the inclusion of moderator variables allowed data to be collected along specific lines of inquiry, 
thus affording the cell facilitators the opportunity to keep cell discussions concretely focused 
during game play.  
 
Based on the three research questions posed in this project, the independent, dependent and 
moderator variables were identified as follows: 
 
Research Question #1 
 Naval force aggregates afloat (Independent) 
 Implications on force structure? (Dependent) 
 What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF? (Dependent) 
 
Research Question #2 
 Naval force aggregates (Independent) 
 Mission (Moderator) 
 Task organization (Moderator) 
 Battlespace organization (Moderator) 
 Command relationships (Moderator) 
 How do command arrangements evolve? (Dependent) 
 
Naval Services Game 
12 
 
Research Question #3 
 Naval force aggregates (Independent) 
 Outside of typical organizational structures (Moderator) 
 What are other potential approaches? (Dependent) 
 
The NSG sought to answer these questions through direct observation of participants (i.e., 
ethnographic data capture), individual player surveys, facilitator-guided sessions within each of 
the player cells, and via a final, all-inclusive plenary session.  
E. Definition of Key Terms 
In order to ensure that all participants in the game were grounded in a common lexicon, the 
following terms and concepts were provided to them for reference throughout data collection 
periods of the NSG (e.g., individual player surveys, cell-based plenaries). Many of these terms 
were also presented in the academic sessions held prior to game play, which emphasized the 
Maritime Operations Center (MOC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) 
constructs of combined Navy-Marine Corps operations. 
Naval Aggregation: The process of aligning naval forces using common tactics, techniques, and 
procedures in arrangements that allows them to operate in an integrated manner.  The inherent 
mobility, organizational agility, and self-sustainability enable forward postured naval forces to 
tailor themselves across the range of military operations from geographically disparate locations 
with a variety of options. 
Effective aggregation of maritime forces relies on common tactics, techniques, and procedures 
associated with intelligence, command and control (C2), fires, maneuver, logistics, and force 
protection. This underscores the importance of sufficient joint and combined training, and of 
interoperable systems, to achieving and sustaining operational readiness. The Naval Service 
constantly seeks to sustain this critical foundation, to include allies and partners.  The intertwined 
dynamic of the air/sea-superiority fight and the amphibious assault makes it critical that these 
operations are tactically integrated. 
The following key terms and definitions were internally developed during the design phase of the 
2012 Naval Services Game, and used by players as common language in their plenary 
discussions and survey responses. 
 
Gap: Gaps are shortfalls, imposed limitations, and missing elements necessary for accomplishing 
objectives. 
Principle: A guideline grounded in a foundation of past experiences and present observations, 
intended to shape future actions. 
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The following additional key terms and definitions were used throughout game play: 
Doctrine:  The way we fight (e.g., emphasizes maneuver warfare, combined air-ground 
campaigns). Fundamental principles by which military forces, or elements thereof, guide their 
actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. 
(CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007) 
Organization: How we organize to fight divisions, air wings, MAGTFs. Defines the structures 
and groupings that are used by formations and units on operations. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 
1 May 2007) 
Training: How we prepare to fight tactically; basic training to advanced individual training, 
various types of unit training, joint exercises, etc. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007) 
Materiel: All the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces, that is ships, tanks, self-propelled 
weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real 
property, installations, and utilities necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military 
activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 1-
02) 
Leadership: How we prepare our leaders to fight from the squad leader to four-star-
General/Admiral. Further defines specific training and leadership requirements; this refers to the 
development of leaders primarily through further education. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 
2007) 
Personnel: The availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency 
operations. Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the 
assigned mission. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007) 
Facility: A real property such as installations and industrial facilities that support our forces. 
(CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007) 
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II. GAME DESIGN 
A. Discussion of Game Design 
The 2012 Naval Services Game (NSG) was held over three days, from 11-13 September 2012 at 
the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Figure 2.1 and table 2.1 depict 
the overall flow of the game, while Appendix “D” provides the detailed schedule of events. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – 2012 Naval Services Game Design Flow 
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Table 2.1 – 2012 Naval Services Game Summary Schedule 
The Naval Services Game (NSG) was a one-sided (i.e., opposing force elements embedded into 
the scenario as opposed to free play), professionally facilitated seminar style event. It was 
comprised of three, unclassified time-stepped vignettes, each of which expanded aggregation of 
the BLUE force in the maritime environment.  
The vignettes featured a fictitious scenario employing real world geography. Set in the year 
2014, a notional conflict between the countries of GREEN and RED served as the initial 
condition, with the country of GREEN identified as a key democratic partner of BLUE. An 
overview of Vignettes 1-3 follows: 
 Vignette 1 (Initial Crisis, C-7 to C-Day) – BLUE Forces: ARG/MEU, CSG, LCS 
 Vignette 2 (Advance Force and Entry Operations, C-Day to C+15) – BLUE Forces: Vignette 
1 BLUE Forces + JTF, JFMCC, JFACC, MEB/ESG CE, ARG/MEU, MCM, SOF 
 Vignette 3 (Sustained Maritime Operations, C+15 to C+40) – BLUE Forces: Vignette 2 
BLUE Forces + MPS, FIE, CSG, JFLCC 
Participants in BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B were expected to focus on naval force 
aggregation issues and the evolution of command relationships throughout the game. Both cells 
played from the perspective of the Service Component Commander during Vignette 1 and from 
the viewpoint of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) staff during 
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Vignettes 2 and 3. The WHITE Cell (also referred to as the Control Cell) acted as the Combatant 
Commander during Vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force Commander 
during Vignettes 2 and 3. BLUE cell players were provided with the scenario, higher 
headquarters Operational Order (OPORD), BLUE force flow, and both GREEN and RED force 
composition and actions. 
B. Game Mechanics and Participant Assignments 
During the morning of the first day (11 September 2012), players convened in the McCarty Little 
Hall (MLH) Decision Support Center where they received a series of briefings that created a 
common understanding of initial conditions at the start of the first vignette. Briefing topics 
included a game overview along with presentations on the MOC, JFMCC, MAGTF, and CWC 
constructs. The final presentation consisted of the road to war brief and an overview of vignette 1 
(refer to Appendix A of this game report).  
Following these presentations, the 35 participants were divided into two player cells, referred to 
as BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B, respectively. Participants assigned to BLUE cell A were 
primarily USN/USMC officers currently serving in operational billets. In contrast, BLUE cell B 
participants were primarily from supporting establishment billets.  
The two cells were given an identical scenario, and were asked to complete a situation review, 
Course of Action (COA) development activity, and individual WEB-IQ surveys. Cell members 
also participated in a facilitated seminar discussion and a WEB-IQ threaded discussion activity 
for each vignette.  
A detailed demographic summary of NSG players including their names, ranks, and 
organizations/commands is found in Appendix E of this Report. In brief, players in the NSG 
represented officer pay grades O-4 through O-6. They averaged 21 years of service per 
participant, including nearly 7 years of experience at the battalion/command level. Players were 
highly educated, with 69 percent of participants holding a master’s degree or higher.  
With respect to warfare specialties, figure 2.2 summarizes that 34 percent served in the 
surface/submarine warfare community, 29 percent of participants were borne from the Navy and 
Marine aviation, 14 percent were USMC ground combat experts, 14 percent served in the 
intelligence/information dominance community, and 9 percent belonged to the USMC logistics 
military occupational specialty (0402).  
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Figure 2.2 – Warfare Specialty Areas of 2012 Naval Services Game Participants 
Both BLUE Cell A and Cell B were comparably matched in terms of players’ education (refer to 
Appendix E of this Report), with 69 percent of the players holding a master’s degree or higher. 
As shown in figure 2.3, participants in the 2012 Naval Services Game possessed a wealth of 
battalion/command experience (mean=6.5 years). BLUE cells A and B, each contained a nearly 
equal number of Navy and Marine Corps representatives. The command/battalion experience 
difference between the two player cells was statistically insignificant. 
 
Figure 2.3 – Mean Years of Battalion/Command Experience per Player Cell 
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The WHITE cell, also referred to in this Report as the Control Cell, consisted of NWC WGD and 
MCWL WGD staff. These personnel were responsible for responding to any requests for 
information (RFIs) that the player cells submitted. The WHITE cell also served as the Combatant 
Commander during vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force Commander 
during vignettes 2 and 3. Lastly, WHITE cell members were charged with analyzing the COAs 
submitted by the cells and determining any follow-on opposing force actions that would take 
place in order to stimulate discussion about gaps, principles, and insights that the players 
identified during the each vignette. 
Upon completion of identifying discussion points to emphasize with the players based on their 
actions and the game’s overarching research questions, facilitated seminars were conducted at 
the end of each vignette (11 and 12 September 2012). These discussions provided the 
opportunity for players to present their perspectives and insights on the gaps, principles, and 
insights associated with naval force aggregation. Ethnographers are assigned to each BLUE cell 
in order to capture these discussion highlights. The WEB-IQ software application was used to 
launch both the individual player surveys and to capture player comments in a threaded 
discussion format. 
On the final morning of the NSG (13 September 2012), both BLUE cells were allowed time to 
revise the gaps, principles, and insights identified during each of the three vignettes. This refined 
information was incorporated into BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B outbriefs (refer to Appendix 
B). These briefings were subsequently presented during the combined plenary activity, which 
took place on the afternoon of 13 September 2012. This combined plenary activity served as the 
first opportunity for both BLUE cells formally to exchange ideas in a facilitated forum.  
The full schedule of events for the Naval Services Game is found in Appendix D of this game 
report.  
III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
A. Summary of Player-Identified Data 
 
During the course of game play, the participants were asked to identify any potential gaps and 
propose principles based on the difficulties they faced in aggregating naval forces. Both BLUE A 
and B cell participants were expected to focus on naval force aggregation issues and the 
evolution of command relationships throughout game play. Despite the differences in the 
composition of BLUE cells A and B, findings between the two cells were nearly identical. 
 
On the final day, players participated in a combined plenary session where they presented the 
COAs developed during each vignette and discussed the gaps, principles and insights identified 
during gameplay. Senior naval services leaders, such as RADM John Christenson (NWC), BGen 
Mark Wise (MCWL), RDML Ann Phillips (ESG-2), and CAPT Michael Napolitano, 
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representing RADM Michael Tillotson (NECC), were also present during this session and their 
insights were captured for inclusion in post-game analysis. 
The following gaps and principles were identified by either BLUE cell A or BLUE cell B, and in 
some cases by both, but not in prioritized order. They include the descriptive summaries of the 
player-identified gaps and principles, as well as their associated recommendations for 
improvement. 
a. Descriptive Summary of Player Identified Gaps and Proposed Solutions 
Identified Gap Description Proposed Solution 
Insufficient doctrine 
Service doctrine does not effectively 
address the aggregation of naval forces. 
Doctrine is needed to describe how to 
aggregate forces consistent with the 
principles of C2 simplicity, flexibility, 
unity of command, unity of effort, and 
seniority. 
Develop Navy and Marine 
warfighting publications in 
USMC/USN formal schools at all 
levels that educate officers on 
naval force aggregation. Review 
and update existing doctrine to 
reflect current service capabilities. 
MOCs and other naval 
staffs are not integrated, 
organized and manned 
Current Staff compositions and 
functionality are oriented toward either 
maritime or land. This doesn’t provide a 
commander with SMEs needed to inform 
decisions. The lack of staff integration 
causes gaps between USN/USMC forces. 
Reorganize Naval Staffs, assigning 
Navy and Marine Corps personnel 
to the appropriate functional areas. 
Permanently integrate Navy 
personnel into Marine staffs and 
Marine personnel into MOCs. 
These combined staffs will be able 
to provide better tailored support to 
the warfighter. 
Limited common 
training 
There is a knowledge (i.e. training) gap 
in both USN and USMC in regards to 
other service’s doctrine, staff 
organization, operation, resources and 
capabilities of assets. Multi-MEU 
operations are not practiced. Exercises 
and training always start at the final level 
of effort (MEU or MEB) rather than 
starting small and growing as forces 
arrive. CSG and MEU/MED training is 
not currently conducted. Cross service 
capabilities and operations are not 
understood and therefore complicate the 
coordination, command relationships, 
and mission execution. 
Conduct Naval Services 
PME/Wargames. Service schools 
and distance education programs 
must teach staff processes, 
organization, resources and 
capabilities. Formalize a process 
for integrating MEU. Combine 
MEUs and place MEU 
commanders into lead roles of the 
land, ACE, etc. Conduct cross 
service training and exercises. 
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Operational logistics 
lacks doctrine, 
organization, training 
and systems to integrate 
The aggregation of the warfighting 
function of logistics at the operational 
level, when it is primarily seabased, is 
challenging. Logistical support is 
required not only within the Joint 
Operation Area (JOA), but also around 
it. The question of who is responsible for 
and how to execute logistics becomes an 
issue. Aggregating forces together can 
result in relationships that have differing 
and incompatible logistics chains. As 
forces aggregrate, we need to provide 
continuity of logistics both afloat and for 
those transitioning from sea to shore. 
Improve joint training and 
coordination between entities for 
the application of operational 
logistics inside and outside of the 
JOA. More formal structures are 
required for training and practical 
experience as we continue to 
operate in more joint 
environments. CJTF direct 
additional theater logistics (T-
AOE/T-AKE) to support the 
CJFMCC. This will provide 
seabased logistics for both forces 
afloat and ashore until a solid log 
trail is established ashore for 
ground forces. 
Current equipment and 
systems lacks the 
interoperability 
The only allies possessing a mature and 
secure comm link are our NATO allies. 
The ability to pass secure comm and data 
to non-NATO allies remains a challenge. 
Upgrade comms onboard existing 
naval and allied shipping. 
Battlespace 
organization 
There lacks a common, holistic 
understanding of how to organize the 
battlespace to support the naval battle. In 
order to eliminate the seam that exists 
between land and sea domains during 
littoral operations, a different way of 
thinking, organizing, and employing 
control measures needs to be developed 
Establish TTPs that yield naval and 
joint doctrine and allow a 
continuous flow of operations from 
sea to littoral to landward 
objectives. 
Existing Naval 
Headquarters are not 
fully capable of 
conducting full-
spectrum littoral 
operations. 
Currently Naval HQs are capable of 
conducting integrated naval operations, 
but lack the understanding of amphibious 
and land operations necessary to conduct 
integrated littoral operations. 
USMC structure and personnel 
should be permanently assigned to 
existing Fleet HQs to enable 
littoral operations and single naval 
battle principles within the 
maritime operations areas. An 
integrated USMC/USN Joint Force 
Littoral Component Commander 
(JFLWCC) should be established 
where sea/air control and power 
projection are inextricably linked. 
Seabase Aggregation 
and C2 
As naval forces aggregate within the 
JOA, the seabased footprint will continue 
to grow. Command, Control, and 
visibility of seabased assets become 
more complex and may exceed the 
capabilities of multiple CTF 
commanders. 
Assign a single commander 
responsibility for all seabased 
assets. Operational level C2 of all 
seabased sustainment assets will 
enable flexible and responsive 
support to the JFMCC and JTF 
commanders. 
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JFMCC 
Communications 
JFMCC must look up and out, not just 
down and in. JFMCC comms can be 
restricted if afloat on platforms where 
existing commander and staffs are 
already embarked. Need a standardized 
comms suite to support JFMCC and 
existing commander and staffs. 
Determine combined comms 
requirements for all organizations 
embarked when JFMCC is afloat. 
Develop materiel solution that 
meets requirements and includes 
future expandability. 
JFMCC ISR 
Limitations of current organic ISR 
capabilities hinder the achievement of 
persistent ISR and the ability to cover the 
dimensions of the single naval 
battlespace. 
Increase organic naval ISR and 
include USN/USMC personnel in 
Naval staff integration and training 
to ensure seamless processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination. 
 
b. Descriptive Summary of Player Identified Principles 
Principles Description 
Naval Staffs 
Naval staffs are comprised of both USN and USMC personnel to 
provide full command and control in a single staff. The JFMCC staff is 
the primary incorporation of this principle and is organized along 
functional operational lines of in a construct such as naval battle with 
appropriately skilled USN/USMC personnel assigned to each functional 
area. The JFMCC staff and lower echelon staffs such as CSG, ESG, and 
MEB incorporate permanent staff officers to facilitate force integration 
at that level. As forces aggregate, staffs need to be combined or utilized 
in different manners (including removing someone from command). 
Experience and seniority of CDR and Staff-command relationships are 
easier to define. Knowledge and ability to find critical information 
about unit capabilities are critical for providing the Commander with an 
accurate picture. 
Integrated Operational Planning 
Naval forces require common operating terms and graphics, common 
tactics, techniques and procedures, and the appropriate material 
solutions (systems) in order to support common understanding. They 
need to be consistent with concepts like Joint Operational Access and 
Air Sea Battle. The naval service must also have systems fully capable 
of seamless information exchange. The continuous process of planning 
and sequencing key events relative to one another in a timely and 
coordinated manner to ensure continuity of operations and desired 
operational tempo. In context, this addresses seamless operational 
execution that seeks to avoid transitional gaps. 
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Continuity of Command and 
Effective C2 
Developing command and control architecture with a flexible construct 
facilitates seamless transition of authority as mission requirements 
concurrently increase with level of command and organizational 
responsibility and capacity. Transfer of authority at every level of 
command should be planned in detail in order to offset staff and force 
rotations and avoid simultaneous knowledge and experience gaps. 
During the process of naval force aggregation, the principle of 
simplicity must be observed. Existing command structures that continue 
to provide effective C2 should be maintained so that new forces and 
capabilities can be added with minimal disruption. Although naval 
force aggregation is initially about command and control between USN 
and USMC forces, it must also be able to operate in and easily 
transition to the context of joint C2. C2 arrangements need to be 
complimentary to established joint C2 such as functional and/or service 
componency. When aggregating a force, unity of effort will often prove 
more effective in accomplishing the mission than strict adherence to 
unity of command. For subordinate units, the supporting/supported 
relationships will more easily synchronize when there is no argument 
about who is in charge. This will allow for greater flexibility as the 
focus of effort changes throughout the various phases of the operation. 
Interoperability 
Technology, Culture, Language. Force must be able to work together 
(comms, systems, etc.) More cross service and cross community 
training and experience is required to be effective moving forward. 
Forces which are able to link resources, share C2 nodes, and coordinate 
actions real time have a distinct advantage. 
Common Training and 
Education 
Implementing supported/supporting relationship is easier with 
training/practice. 
Mission Precedence 
The commander must identify the priority mission and adjust 
supported/supporting relationships to appropriately synchronized 
priorities. 
Force Flow and Arrival Time 
Force Flow and Arrival Time Description:  Force aggregation is driven 
by the requirement to build a larger force than the initial first arriving 
crisis response force(s). The operational commander determines how 
and when these forces arrive into his AO based on mission 
requirements. As possible, units/ships preparing to deploy as the FOE 
for a naval crisis response force should be tailored and embarked IAW 
mission requirements and time constraints in order to reduce or 
eliminate the requirement for operational pause in the AO and create a 
more seamless transition into the operation. 
Consistency 
Task organization should account for incoming forces so that each time 
a new unit enters the theater the organizational chart doesn’t need to 
change. 
Professionalism 
Commanders need to be mission oriented and overcome difficulties in 
personal interaction 
Flexibility Establish a CSF with a subordinate Strike Warfare Commander 
Combat Efficiency 
Maximize the use of resources and the unity of effort. 
Duration 
Ability to sustain. Aggregation options and execution are dependent on 
the duration of the operation. 
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Span of Control 
Commanders must be able to understand and acknowledge if/when the 
level of effort has expanded beyond their ability to effectively control 
the operation.  
Understanding the capabilities of 
assigned units 
Commanders and operators must understand what forces in the JOA are 
capable of what missions. Assigned forces must also understand what 
the Commander can do for them. 
Battlespace Organization 
Command relationships should be generated based on mission 
execution and sequencing rather than previous experience. 
Seaborne Sustainment 
If the objective is to aggregate and fight from the sea, then a 
sustainment plan should be planned from the sea as well. 
Flexibility 
Not all assets will be in place conducting missions that reflect the 
changes in environment. It’s a requirement to remain flexibly minded, 
as no plan survives contact. 
Proximity 
Suboptimal command structure shortfalls can be alleviated by 
subordinate command proximity (either by geography or informational 
flow). The ability to develop plans with different staffs in the same 
location cannot be overlooked. 
Clear Tasking CDRs must be able to convey their expectations to the subordinates. 
 
B. Analysis of Player-Identified Data   
 
After the game concluded, the DCAT performed structured analysis on the NGS’s six data 
streams including descriptive quantitative statistics, qualitative content analysis and grounded 
theory as discussed in Appendix F of this Report.  
 
The terms provided in this section were identified using grounded theory and analyzed using the 
ATLAS.ti co-occurrence function (see Appendix G). Pairs of terms scoring the highest overall 
correlation values were included in this analysis.  In addition, Pearson Product Moment 
Correlation (i.e., “Pearson’s r”) and r-squared analysis were also performed on each of the term 
pairs coded from the six data streams discussed in Section III of this Report. The overall 
Pearson’s r was recorded at .937, suggesting a strong correlation between the paired terms 
identified in this section. Lastly, r-squared analysis yielded a percentage of 87.8, meaning that 
nearly 88 percent of the change in the dependent variables (implications on force structure, gaps 
across DOTMLPF, evolution of command arrangements) could be explained by, or shared with 
the change in the independent variable (naval force aggregation) .  
 
Based on analysis of these data, fostering command relationships was deemed to be the most 
critical gap presently faced in conducting cooperative Navy-Marine Corps operations. Analysis 
further revealed that the doctrine, leadership, training, and organization facets of DOTMLPF 
should be leveraged to improve these relationships and that such planning and coordination must 
be considered prior to engaging in a conflict. The difficulties faced by the Navy and Marine 
Corps in engaging in combined operations are depicted in figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 –Analysis of NSG Player Responses: Most Important to Mission Accomplishment 
 
Specifically, through pre-conflict training, exercises, games, and doctrine, both the Navy and the 
Marine Corps need to develop a better understanding of one another’s unique culture, leadership 
proclivities, and maritime and amphibious resources. Service staffs also need to become better 
integrated in a simplified C2 structure. These gaps become most evident during combined 
operations in the littorals, where commanders appear to face the greatest challenges due to a lack 
of an integrated C2, and the absence of understanding in service culture and difficulties 
holistically leveraging the Navy maritime capabilities and Marine Corps amphibious resources. 
 
Not surprisingly, as game play moved from initial crisis response (vignettes 1 and 2) and the 
advancement of the force into sustained operations (vignette 3), doctrine and organizational 
needs stabilized, although requirements for continued training and leadership remained. As 
depicted in figure 3.2, these factors were also deemed the most difficult to obtain in order to 
accomplish the commander’s stated mission. 
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Figure 3.2 – Analysis of NSG Player Responses: Most Difficult to Mission Accomplishment 
Specific analytic responses to three research questions posed in the Naval Services Game are 
provided below. 
 
Question #1: As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force structure?  
What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF? 
 
Response: Overwhelmingly, players in both cells emphasized the importance of cultivating 
command relationships as a precursor to effective force aggregation. These relationships were 
defined as personal, structural, organizational, formal and informal, and were deemed a precursor 
to effective force aggregation. Specifically, fostering organizational unity of command and 
developing a simplified command and control (C2) element through the use of integrated staffs 
were also identified as essential preparatory steps prior to engaging in a combined Navy-Marine 
Corps fight. Further analysis into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) revealed that the elements of doctrine, 
organization, leadership and training manifest the greatest gaps in present-day Navy-Marine 
Corps joint operations. 
 
Doctrine 
Throughout game play, several key doctrinal gaps affecting the ability to aggregate a naval force 
were identified. The lack of guidance pertaining to command and control relationships among 
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Navy and Marine Corps players was most notable. This included the lack of common 
understanding of the service specific capabilities, terminology, tasks, organization and missions 
which made coordination a challenge. Due to this lack of collective understanding, much of the 
discussion during each vignette was spent trying to determine the initial command relationships, 
as detailed in the following player comment: 
A simple example comes in the form of how we (each of the services) talk about support 
between different portions of the force. The ‘supported-supporting’ concept is very 
normal to personnel in the US Navy, but is a little more foreign to personnel in the US 
Marine Corps (that is not to say that we don't understand it, it is to say that it is not how 
we do business on a day to day basis). On the other side of that coin, Marines tend to talk 
about the Main Effort and supporting efforts. Neither is incorrect, and it was interesting 
to note that during the course of the discussion we saw people saying effectively the same 
things, but having trouble understanding each other because of the way they were 
describing them. 
Proposed solutions to these gaps focused on additions to or creation of new doctrine focused on 
force aggregation. Many players described the need for a different way of thinking about, 
organizing and employing control measures to eliminate the seam that exists between sea and 
land domains during littoral operations. Current capabilities of services have changed 
significantly, and that has fueled pre-conceived notions of how to conduct command and control 
of aggregated naval forces, “for example, consider utilizing a JTF-capable Marine Corps staff as 
a JFMCC that can affect the air, land and maritime domains” with Navy augmentation to 
increase capability in the maritime domain.  A preponderance of the players noted that 
aggregation is highly achievable as long as there is common doctrine and understanding of 
respective Navy and Marine Corps capabilities that is currently lacking. 
 
Organization 
 
Organizational shortfalls were highlighted during this game. Players noted that current 
organizational stovepipes hamper flexibility and effective utilization of forces. This was 
particularly evident when the players crossed service lines and integrated with Special 
Operations Forces. In some cases, the TACON/OPCON relationships did not directly correlate 
between the Navy and Marine Corps task organization.  Participants were concerned about 
getting the command and control relationships and organization right. 
 
Players also cited the need to permanently integrate the Navy and Marine Corps staffs in order to 
establish formal and informal relationships that would foster trust and mutual understanding. 
“Creating a Naval Staff does not just happen by putting both Marines and Navy personnel on the 
staff. The staff also needs to be functionally reorganized to ensure that all aspects… are covered 
and that the staff is able to effectively inform the commander during the decision making 
process.” 
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Leadership 
 
The need for strong support from both Navy and Marine Corps leadership for aggregating naval 
forces was consistently noted throughout the game.  Players stated that leadership was the key to 
enabling all considerations in the development of a coherent plan and establishment of germane 
command relationships. “The mission is well within the capabilities of the USN/USMC team, so 
it falls on the leadership to navigate the C2 and ensure the forces are supported so they can get 
on with the mission.” 
 
Training  
 
All players agreed that the Navy and Marine Corps lack the experience and knowledge base to 
currently aggregate forces above the MEB/ESG level. Specifically cited was a lack of awareness 
of each other’s service capabilities. Training for both service staffs is required to enhance the 
interoperability of personnel and systems in support of naval aggregation. The infrequency of 
MEB/ESG level exercises was also an area of concern. Players stated that a once a year exercise 
such as Bold Alligator is not sufficient to develop the knowledge to perform this complex 
operation. Frequent exercises will foster better understanding between the Navy-Marine Corps 
staffs which in turn will facilitate intuitive decisions on command and control. “Conducting more 
joint training events and stressing those seams is the only way to really reveal the problem so we 
can come up with best practices and mitigating factors.”  
 
Question #2: Relative to the following areas (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace 
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will command 
arrangements evolve? 
 
Response: Game participants identified lack of service culture awareness and diminished 
understanding of cross-domain resources as the greatest challenges to combined Navy-Marine 
Corps force aggregation. Specifically, Navy personnel did not fully comprehend amphibious 
operations, whereas Marine Corps participants acknowledged only cursory familiarity with 
maritime operations. This lack of fluency between the services presented the greatest challenge 
for players when planning viable courses of action for combined operations in the littorals. 
Moreover, because the composition and functionality of staffs are presently bifurcated towards 
either maritime or land operations, mission planning, and task and battlespace organization  
continue to challenge the commander engaged in combined Navy-Marine Corps operations.  
Cell participants aptly noted that challenges abound based on whether or not “we are trying to 
establish ‘joint’ command and control or ‘Navy and Marine Corps’ command and control that is 
equally capable of affecting the sea, air and land domains” Respondents noted “we're pretty good 
at joint C2 that takes place at the JTF-level, [however] what we need to develop is a 
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reinvigorated ‘Navy and Marine Corps’ command and control capability.” This was deemed 
especially important when establishing the “homogenous littoral battlespace.” 
Lastly, players noted that evolving arrangements suggest that: 
There are a few models that exist for what to do to bring MEUs together under a 
MEB. We could simply leave them intact and allow the MEUs to operate. We 
could disaggregate the MEUs and bring in additional GCE, LCE and ACE 
headquarters. CSG and ARG/MEU intel organizations will continue to support 
their primary tactical customers. Regardless, the challenge will be in allocating 
scarce collection resources to support amphibious operations, air wing strike 
operations, mine clearance, force protection of the ESF and forces on the ground, 
and other combat operations in the littoral and on the ground. 
Question #3: What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces outside of 
typical organizational structures?   
 
Due to the finite time constraints imposed upon game play (i.e., three vignettes over less than 
two days of game play), participants in the 2012 Naval Services Game opted to focus on the 
gaps, principles, and issues germane to force aggregation rather than delve into alternate 
perspectives on atypical organizational structures. However, data garnered from both cells 
suggests that regardless of organizational structure considered, greater emphasis needs to be 
placed on cultivating command relationships, and simplifying and unifying command and 
control structures.  
 
It should be noted that the analytic findings of the NSG’s DCAT are consistent with the findings 
of the 2009 Navy-Marine Corps Command Relationships Game and the 2011 Maritime Stability 
Operations Game, both of which suggest a new paradigm of interoperability, one forged in pre-
established relationships between entities such as the Naval services are important, especially 
when the Navy and the Marine Corps are engaged in combined operations in the littorals.  In the 
words of the players, this issue “poses a series of important questions that we probably won't get 
to in the conduct of this game, but certainly need to be looked in a future session.” 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
STUDY 
The findings of the 2012 Naval Services Game suggest that as a conflict matures, Navy and 
Marine Corps activities are able to become more integrated and function more effectively. 
However, at the onset of conflict, coordination issues are a significant challenge for the 
Operational Commander given the lack of pre-existing command relationships, disparate C2 
structures, and cultural differences between maritime-focused Navy resources and amphibious-
minded Marine assets.  
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In order for effective mission accomplishment, a more holistic approach to developing command 
relationships is warranted—one that emphasizes forming relationships pre-conflict through 
improved doctrine, training, organization (including C2 staff integration), and leadership.  
The 2012 Naval Services Game brought together warfighters from the USN and USMC in order 
to explore issues germane to force aggregation in combined operations. Indeed, game findings 
collectively highlighted the cultural differences between both services and the need to enhance 
command relationships—ultimately yielding more integrated and efficient command and control 
structures. Analysis further suggests that aggregating forces for operations conducted in the 
littorals presents the greatest challenges for Navy-Marine Corps missions.  
Additional efforts to cultivate command relationships should be undertaken including, but not 
limited to conducting additional games focused on inter-cultural awareness and the continued 
refinement of principles and gaps through analysis; developing and exercising C2 integrated 
staffing models; and formulating doctrine to address aggregation and provide guidance to gap 
closure. Moreover, the development of a 2013 Naval Services Game to continue exploring Navy 
and Marine Corps operations is recommended. Lastly, the Naval Warfare Group should be 
consulted to distill other tangible actions for future decision/direction.  
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V. APPENDICES & SUPPLEMENTAL DATA 
Appendix A – Scenario and Summary of Vignettes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background 
The fictional country of GREEN is a developing country in Southeast Asia with a population 
estimated to be around 4,500,000 people. GREEN is an established democracy and a key 
democratic partner of the U.S. in the region. The GREEN military is small, poorly trained, and 
ill-equipped for a sustained military engagement. They have a ground force of approximately 
five infantry brigades (BDEs), a motorized BDE, three militia BDEs and one special forces 
battalion (BN). GREEN also has four squadrons of helicopters, as well as patrol boats. While 
GREEN currently receives U.S. military training assistance, they are still poorly trained and 
equipped across the board. 
The fictional country of RED is also a developing country in Southeast Asia that borders 
GREEN. The population of RED is estimated at around 6,500,000 people. RED is under the 
control of an Authoritarian government. The military is far more advanced and numbered than 
the neighboring country of GREEN. RED has a ground force comprised of two infantry divisions 
(DIVs), two motorized DIVs, an airborne BDE, a riverine BDE, and two infantry BDEs. They 
also have multiple squadrons and aircraft (fighter, ground attack, and transportation), an air 
defense DIV, and a considerable maritime component. In addition, RED also has a cyber-
exploitation, attack, and defense unit though they have not demonstrated effective skills. 
Scenario  
The neighboring countries of GREEN and RED are disputing territorial boundaries and natural 
resources.  These disputes have led to confrontations between the two countries’ naval patrol 
vessels over contested maritime borders.  RED has blockaded the Mekong River which is an 
important source of commerce for both countries.  There are indications and warnings that RED 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The NSG was a one-sided, professionally facilitated seminar event. It consisted of three, 
unclassified, time-stepped vignettes, each of which expanded upon the aggregation of BLUE 
forces in the maritime environment. The vignettes featured a notional scenario using real 
world geography. The participants were placed into one of two BLUE cells who were 
playing from the perspective of the Service Component Commander during vignette 1, and 
from vantage point of the Joint Forces Commander during vignettes 2 and 3. The WHITE 
cell (i.e., Control), was comprised of NWC WGD and MCWL WGD staff who served as the 
Combatant Commander during vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force 
Commander during vignettes 2 and 3. 
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intends to invade GREEN in order to settle border and resource disputes.  RED actions are 
threatening regional stability and economic growth. The U.S. President has ordered the U.S. 
military, BLUE, to conduct Flexible Deterrent Operations (FDO) against RED and to be 
prepared to defend GREEN if necessary. 
Currently, U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force - GREEN (JSOTF-G) and Special Purpose 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTAF) with LPD-17 are conducting Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations in GREEN. Blue LCS is 
conducting port calls and conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the Gulf 
of Thailand and a BLUE ARG/MEU is concluding an exercise in the vicinity of GREEN. 
 
Figure A.1 Fictional Countries of Red and Green 
Vignette 1: Initial Crisis 
Vignette 1 starts at day C-7.  RED has placed its forces on the highest level of security alert and 
is currently conducting deception operations. They are massing their forces along the GREEN 
border and preparing their mining vessels to get underway. RED is also increasing naval 
patrolling in the vicinity of RED and the disputed islands and deploying their ASCMs. ISR 
indicates that RED is preparing to invade GREEN. 
The United States government, in response, has condemned the actions of RED, stating that 
RED’S behavior not only infringes upon the sovereignty of GREEN, but also threatens freedom 
of navigation, regional security, and regional economic growth. The President of the United 
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States has ordered the military to prepare all necessary responses to deter RED, defend GREEN 
if necessary, and to conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) of 200 American 
citizens (AMCITs). The AMCITs are situated in two locations: one hundred are in GREEN’S 
capitol city of Phnom Penh and the other one hundred are in the west coast city of Sihanoukville.  
Other than the in-country available forces, an ARG/MEU, CSG, and a second LCS are arriving. 
At this time, BLUE actions in RED territory are limited to ISR. It is assessed that RED will most 
likely not interfere with the NEO, but may challenge U.S. presence at sea. GREEN is currently 
preparing defensive operations and has activated their militia. 
PACOM Initiating Directive for Operation Deter and Respond 
Mission Statement: On order, COMPACFLT conducts FDO and NEO in GREEN and adjacent 
waters in order to deter RED aggression against GREEN and to safeguard American citizens. 
USPACOM has designated COMPACFLT as the supported command for Operation Deter and 
Respond. MARFORPAC and SOCPAC are designated as supporting commands. 
PACOM Tasks to COMPACFLT: 
 Conduct show of force 
 Conduct ISR 
 Conduct NEO 
 Prepare to support U.S. forces in Green as required 
 Provide Personnel Recovery 
PACOM Tasks to MARFORPAC: 
 Conduct show of force 
 Conduct ISR 
 Conduct NEO 
 Prepare to support U.S. forces in Green as required 
 Provide Personnel Recovery 
PACOM Tasks to SOCPAC: 
 Conduct ISR 
 Conduct FID 
 Provide support to NEO 
Vignette 2: Advance Force and Entry Operations 
Vignette 2 encompasses D-Day to D+15/C-Day C+15. The NEO has been successfully 
completed. RED has invaded GREEN, but has not yet engaged BLUE forces. RED infantry and 
airborne battalions (BNs) have occupied key terrain along the GREEN coast. RED’S naval 
forces are operating along GREEN’S coastline mining GREEN waters.  GREEN is defending 
their territory, but their southern infantry has been defeated and their navy completely destroyed. 
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GREEN has formally requested U.S. military assistance and BLUE has been ordered to defend 
GREEN.  PACOM has stood up the JTF Rapid Response. JFLCC is not yet arrived and is not 
operational in the JOA at this time. BLUE available forces are: LPD-17, 2x LCS, SP MAGTF, 
JSOTF-G, ARG/MEU, CSG, JFMCC, JFACC, MEB/ESG CE, MCM, a second ARG / MEU and 
additional SOF. 
JTF OPORD 
JTF Mission Statement: On order, JTF Rapid Response conducts operations in the JOA to defeat 
Red aggression against Green, in order to preserve the Green government and ensure Green 
territorial integrity. 
JTF Commander’s Intent 
Purpose:  Conduct operations to defeat Red attacking forces in Green, in order to preserve the 
Green government and ensure Green territorial integrity. 
Method:  Rapidly aggregate joint forces to respond to the Red invasion of Green.  Initially, we 
will rely on forward postured naval and air forces to ensure our access to the JOA and to rapidly 
shift to offensive operations against Red.  We must rapidly build additional capabilities to 
conduct sea and air control and take offensive actions to shape the landward battlespace. We will 
swiftly project power in order to defeat Red forces in Green.  As much as we are able, we will 
maximize sea-based joint forces, so we are not reliant on or limited to a single S/APOD.  We will 
maximize our relationships with Green forces and the friendly local population.  I envision 
JFMCC being the main effort from phases I to IV. 
Endstate:  Green sovereign territory is secure, the Green government is preserved, and any Red 
forces in Green have been defeated. 
JTF CONOPS 
Phase I – Shape and Control 
JTF Tasks to JFMCC: 
 Establish sea and air control 
 Conduct offensive strike operations 
 Conduct ISR 
 Support Green forces and U.S. forces ashore as required 
 Provide personnel recovery 
 Conduct FID 
 Provide terminal control for strikes 
 Conducting Advance Force Operations 
JTF Tasks to JFACC: 
 Provide aerial refueling and ISR 
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JTF Tasks to JFLCC: 
 Prepare to receive and employ ground forces in following phases 
 
Phase II – Offensive Operations 
JTF Tasks to JFMCC: 
 Maintain sea control 
 Conduct offensive strike operations 
 Conduct ISR 
 Support Green forces and U.S. forces ashore as required 
 Provide personnel recovery 
 Conduct FID 
 Provide terminal control for strikes 
 JTF Tasks to JFACC  
 Maintain air control 
 Conduct offensive strike operations 
 Conduct close air support for Blue and Green forces 
 Conduct ISR and aerial refueling 
JTF Tasks to JFLCC: 
 Prepare to receive and employ ground forces in following phases 
  
Vignette 3: Sustained Maritime Operations 
Vignette 3 encompasses day D+15 to D+40/C+15 to C+40. RED forces are continuing to attack 
on their way towards Phnom Penh. The BLUE JTF Rapid Response is continuing with 
operations while the JFLCCis arriving in the JOA and preparing for operations. BLUE ground 
forces have defeated RED’s airborne BN in the vicinity of Sihanoukville and have control of 
GREEN’s Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) and Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD). BLUE has 
defeated RED’s naval and air forces, establishing air and sea control. RED’s southernmost 
motorized DIV and infantry BDE along the coast are stalled but continuing to attack, while 
GREEN’s southern forces are on the retreat towards the capital. BLUE forces are in Phnom Penh 
supporting GREEN’s defense.  
GREEN and BLUE forces in the north continue to hold against the RED offensive. RED has 
defeated one GREEN infantry BDE and a militia BDE. Though RED northern forces are stalled, 
they are still continuing to attack. BLUE available forces include: LPD-17, 2xLCS, SP MAGTF, 
JSOTF-G, 2xARG/MEU, CSG, JFMCC, JSOTF, JFACC, MEB/ESG CE, MCM, MPS/FIE, and 
another CSG. 
Vignette 3 ends with enabling the transition of ground operations to JFLCC control in order to 
restore sovereignty and conduct stability operations. 
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Phase II – Sustained Offensive Operations 
JTF Tasks to JFMCC 
 Maintain sea control 
 Conduct operations to defeat RED offensive 
 Conduct offensive strike operations 
 Conduct SPOD operations and receive follow-on forces 
 Conduct ISR 
 Support GREEN forces and BLUE forces ashore as required 
 Provide personnel recovery  
 Conduct FID 
 Provide terminal control for strikes 
 
JTF Tasks to JFACC 
 Maintain air control 
 Conduct offensive strike operations 
 Conduct close air support for BLUE and GREEN forces 
 Conduct ISR 
 Conduct APOD operations and receive follow-on forces 
 
JTF Tasks to JFLCC 
 Receive ground forces 
 Prepare to conduct operations in support of GREEN in following Phases 
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Appendix B – Final Outbriefs 
BLUE Cell A: 
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BLUE Cell B: 
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Appendix C – Player Surveys 
Player Background Survey 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
Player Profile Baseline Assessment Sheet 
 
PLAYER NAME:_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
BRANCH OF SERVICE OR 
ORGANIZATION:________________________________________________ 
 
PRESENT COMMAND:________________________________________________________________ 
 
TITLE (RANK IF MILITARY/RETIRED MILITARY OR GS IF 
APPLICABLE):___________________________ 
 
DESIGNATOR OR MOS:________ 
 
TOTAL YEARS OF MILITARY OR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SERVICE:_________ 
 
PLAYER AGE:_________   PLAYER SEX:   M____     F____ 
 
HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL COMPLETED (CHECK ONE): 
 
_____ High School   ______Associate’s Degree  ______Graduate Degree   
 
_____Technical Certificate     ______Bachelor’s Degree        ______ Juris Doctorate 
  
_____Doctoral Degree   _______Medical Degree     ____Other 
            (PhD, PsyD, EdD)        
 
ASSIGNED CELL: 
 
____BLUE A   ____BLUE B   ____WHITE 
 
 WHAT SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTISE WERE YOU ASKED TO BRING TO THE GAME? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DESCRIBE ANY BILLETS HELD AT THE BATTALION LEVEL (USMC) / COMMAND LEVEL 
(NAVY) OR HIGHER THAT CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT THIS GAME: 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AT THE BATTALION/COMMAND LEVEL:______ 
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Post COA Player Survey 
Naval Services Game 2012  
 
INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this survey is to provide timely and candid feedback 
regarding your experience in the formulation of your most recent Course of Action (COA). This 
information will be forwarded to the Naval War College’s Data Collection and Analysis Team 
(DCAT) for post-game analysis. Ultimately, your responses will greatly assist the Naval Services 
in developing principles and identifying potential gaps that result from the aggregation of naval 
forces beyond the ARG/MEU and CSG. You have 15 minutes to complete this survey. 
Please indicate Player cell (Note for WebIQ:  Should be a dropdown menu)  
 -  Blue A 
 -  Blue B 
  
1. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most important component or components to 
accomplishing the mission is/are: 
(Note: You may select up to three) 
 1) Doctrine 
 2) Organization 
 3) Training 
 4) Materiel 
 5) Leadership 
 6) Personnel 
 7) Facilities 
 
2. Please provide additional clarification of your answer in the space below: 
 
3. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most difficult component or components to 
accomplishing the mission is/are: 
(Note: You may select up to three) 
 1) Doctrine 
 2) Organization 
 3) Training 
 4) Materiel 
 5) Leadership 
 6) Personnel 
 7) Facilities 
 
4. Please provide additional clarification of your answer in the space below: 
 
5. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most important action required to achieve force 
aggregation is: 
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6. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most difficult action required to achieve force 
aggregation is: 
 
7. As you reflect upon each of the questions asked in this survey including the important and 
difficult aspects of force aggregation, what ideas, concepts, or principles are becoming more 
apparent to you? 
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Appendix D – Game Schedule 
 
Tuesday, September 11, 2012   
Start End Event Remarks Location  
0715 0800 Check-In Registration MLH Lobby 
0800 0825 Welcome Welcome, Admin Remarks DSC 
0825 0845 Overview Game Overview DSC 
0845 0945 Briefs MOC and JFMCC briefs DSC 
0945 1030 Brief MAGTF Brief DSC 
1030 1100 Brief Composite Warfare Brief DSC 
1130 1200 V1 Road to War and Vignette 1 DSC 
1200 1300 Lunch Player Lunch NWC Café 
1300 1330 Intro 
Cell introductions, Cell familiarization and 
baseline survey Room 207 & 211 
1330 1345 Situation Situation Review Room 207 & 211 
1345 1445 COA Cells Develop COAs Room 207 & 211 
1445 1500 Survey Players’ Survey Room 207 & 211 
1500 1700 Dialog Seminar Discussion Room 207 & 211 
1700 1730 Data Tool-based Data Capture Room 207 & 211 
1800 1900 Social No-Host Evening Social Officers’ club 
 
Wednesday, September 12, 2012   
Start End Event Remarks Location  
0800 0830 V2 Vignette 2 In-Brief Room 207 & 211 
0830 0845 Situation Situation Review Room 207 & 211 
0845 0945 COA Cells Develop COA Room 207 & 211 
0945 1000 Survey Players’ Survey Room 207 & 211 
1000 1200 Dialog Seminar Discussion Room 207 & 211 
1200 1230 Data Tool-based Data Capture Room 207 & 211 
1230 1330 Lunch Player Lunch NWC Café 
1330 1400 V3 Vignette 3 In-Brief Room 207 & 211 
1400 1415 Situation Situation Review Room 207 & 211 
1415 1515 COA Cells Develop COA Room 207 & 211 
1515 1530 Survey Players’ Survey Room 207 & 211 
1530 1730 Dialog Seminar Discussion Room 207 & 211 
1730 1800 Data Tool-based Data Capture Room 207 & 211 
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Thursday, September 13, 2012   
Start End Event Remarks Location  
0800 1100 Seminar Refine Principles and Gaps (Player Cells) Room 207 & 211 
1100 1200 Prep Brief Preparations (Player Cells) Room 207 & 211 
1200 1300 Lunch Player Lunch NWC Café 
1300 1400 Outbriefs Cells Outbrief and Q&A DSC 
1400 1530 Dialog Facilitated Discussion DSC 
1530 1600 ENDEX Final Discussions and Remarks DSC 
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Appendix E – Game Participants and Demographics 
Participants 
The demographic statistics included in this section of the Game Report are based on self-reported 
responses from the players garnered during the baseline survey administered prior to the start of 
vignette 1 (Appendix C). Thirty-five members of the USN and USMC, representing officer pay 
grades O-4 through O-6 served as players in the Naval Services Game. All participants had 
ample knowledge and experience to draw upon when developing potential courses of action and 
identifying challenges that may limit the Navy and Marine Corps’ ability to aggregate a naval 
force. The 35 players averaged more than 20 years of military experience. The players were 
divided into two cells, providing a mixture of subject matter experts from the Navy and Marine 
Corps in each.  
 
Blue A Player Cell: 
 
  
Brown, Daren  LtCol Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
Dickey, Stuart Col Marine Forces Command 
Donovan, Edward  LtCol Combat Logistics Battalion 11, 11
th
 MEU 
Herrera, James Col I MEF 
LaBranche, Rick CAPT Carrier Air Wing 17 
Lehane, John Maj III MEF 
Lowell, James CDR Surface Warfare Officer’s School Command 
Ostrowski, John Col 3
rd
 MEB, III MEF 
Parker, Timothy Col Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
Parrott, Neil CAPT EWTGLANT 
Phillips, Ford Maj Ellis Group 
Posey, Carlos LCDR DESRON 14 
Riccio, Marc Col II MEF 
Seaman, William CAPT Carrier Strike Group Two 
Waltermire, Brad LCDR Carrier Air Wing 17 
Weathered, Ronald LCDR COMCMRON THREE 
Wissen, Frederick LCDR CTF-24 TASW 
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In addition to the BLUE cell A and B participants, a final session including RADM John 
Christenson (NWC), BGen Mark Wise (MCWL), RDML Ann Phillips (ESG-2), and CAPT 
Michael Napolitano, representing RADM Michael Tillotson (NECC), was also conducted, 
during which the perspectives and insights of these senior naval services leaders was captured for 
inclusion in post-game analysis. 
With respect to warfare specialties, 34 percent of participants served in the surface/submarine 
warfare community, 29 percent were USN and USMC aviators, 14 percent were USMC ground 
combat experts, 14 percent served in the intelligence/information dominance community, and 9 
percent belonged to the USMC logistics military occupational specialty (0402). 
 
 
Figure E.1- Warfare Specialty 
34% 
9% 
14% 14% 
29% 
Warfare Specialty Level      
Surface/Submarine
Warfare
Logistics
Intelligence/Information
Dominance
Ground Combat
Aviation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blue B Player Cell: 
 
  
Bjerke, Mark  LCDR COMSUBLANT 
Charney, Michael LtCol 1
st
 Marine Regiment 
Donegan, Don  CDR MWDC DET Washington DC 
Driscoll, Jerome Col Ellis Group 
Gagnon, Jeffrey LtCol Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
James, Barry CDR US Fleet Forces Command 
Keefer, Jason LtCol MAG-16 
Landau, Fred CDR USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH (CVN 77) 
McMillan, Shannon  LCDR USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51) 
Negus, Thomas CAPT Expeditionary Strike Group TWO 
Oles, Gary GS-14 MARSOC 
Pluta, Jim Maj HQMC, Plans, Policies and Operations 
Schendler, Phil LtCol Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Ellis Group 
Schreiner, David Maj HQMC AVN 
Sile, Jack Maj HQMC, Intelligence Department 
Thom, Maxie Mr. OPNAV N2N6 
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Overall, players in the game reported to have had a moderate level of battalion or command 
experience during their military careers.  
 
 
Figure E.2- Comparison of BN/Command Experience between the Cells. 
The NSG participants were highly educated, with 69 percent of the players holding a master’s 
degree. Educational level of participants is displayed in figure E.3. 
 
Figure E.3- Summary of Game Participants’ Education from Baseline Survey 
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Appendix F – Research Methodology 
Overarching Methodology and Analytic Framing 
Given the Naval Services Game’s focus on generating new knowledge to develop a better 
understanding of force aggregation, the overarching methodology for this game was induction. 
Specifically, the DCAT sought to identify terms, phrases, themes, and concepts germane to the 
game’s three research questions. The preponderance of datasets encountered in the NSG were 
qualitative, because they focused on the players’ opinions, beliefs, and values. Quantitative data 
were also included in this project, especially demographic data pertaining to players’ ages, years 
of experience, and level of educational attainment.   
The collection of disparate datasets (i.e., both qualitative and quantitative) suggested that a 
triangulative approach to analysis was warranted.  This process allowed the DCAT to derive the 
same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods. Triangulation has 
incredible power as an analytic technique because it allows the researcher to distinguish between 
exceptions and commonalities in data. Moreover, the use of a triangulative approach allowed the 
DCAT to evaluate data with the appropriate methodology, rather than the methodology driving 
the evaluation. A brief description of each analytic process use in this study’s inductive, 
triangulative approach is described in this section of the Report.  
Content Analysis: A method in which a researcher seeks objectively to describe the content of 
communication messages that people have previously produced, content analysis involves 
identifying coherent and important examples and patterns in the data and subdividing data into 
coherent categories, patterns, and themes.  
Grounded Theory: A more detailed and methodical approach to analysis than content analysis, 
grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical procedures to develop inductively derived 
theory grounded in data. Grounded theory directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that 
they can make general statements about the phenomena they examined. Selective, in-vivo, and 
serendipitous coding were conducted on these data using the ATLAS.ti software application. The 
use of ATLAS.ti is especially cogent for qualitative analysis, because the co-occurrence function 
within this software function allowed the DCAT to determine the level of correlation between 
terms from little or no correlation (r=0) to moderarely correlated (r=.50) to strongly correlated 
(r=1.00).  The co-occurrence function is similar to Pearson Product Moment Correlation in 
quantitative statistics, because the closer the r-value comes to absolute value 1.00, the stronger or 
more highly correlated the relationship between the two terms. Lastly, although direction of 
relationship cannot be computed in ATLAS.ti due to the qualitative relationship of the data, r-
squared analysis was subsequently performed in an effort to determine the percentage of shared 
relationship between each pair of coded terms. 
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Ethnography: Rooted in the field of Anthropology, ethnography occurs with a natural setting 
and seeks understand the social interactions and rationale of players’ of decisions during the 
course of game play. Ethnographers assigned to BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B captured 
qualitative, descriptive data throughout the facilitated discussions, plenary sessions, and final 
outbriefs.  
Collection Approach 
In order to answer the three research questions considered in the 2012 Naval Services Game, six 
primary datasets were collected. These six datasets, their inherent value to this project as data 
streams, and the approach used to analyze them are included in table F.1. 
 
Table F.1 –Datasets Collected, Inherent Value of Data, and Analytic Techniques 
Each of the datasets analyzed in this game are considered descriptive, because they emphasize 
the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships and systems. These descriptive 
datasets were also aggregated to clarify the information that was gathered. 
Before, during, and after the game, members of the DCAT ensured the following parameters for 
these data streams strictly adhered to quality assurance/quality control requirements. 
Dataset Name Inherent Value of Data  Primary Analytical 
Technique & Tool(s)  
Cell-based COA Collective Insights/Macro-level 
Themes  
Grounded Theory using selective 
coding with ATLAS.ti  
Participant Demographic Survey  Participant Background Descriptive Quantitative 
Statistics using Microsoft Excel 
Post-Vignette Participant Survey 
(Open Ended Questions)  
Individual Insights  Grounded Theory using selective 
and in-vivo coding using 
ATLAS.ti  
Post-Facilitated Discussion 
Threaded Session (Plenary)  
Macro-Level Insights  Content Analysis and Grounded 
Theory using selective coding, 
in-vivo and serendipitous coding 
with ATLAS.ti  
Final Outbrief Slides Macro-Level insights Content Analysis and Grounded 
Theory using selective coding, 
in-vivo and serendipitous coding 
with ATLAS.ti  
Ethnographic Notes from Plenary 
Sessions and Final Outbrief 
Macro-Level Insights  Content Analysis and Grounded 
Theory using selective coding, 
in-vivo and serendipitous coding 
with ATLAS.ti  
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Formatting and standardization: COA templates submitted to the White cell were required to 
adhere to the structure provided by the control team.  Any issues with the player cell’s inputs 
were identified during the game and brought to the DCAT who immediately reported their 
concerns to the Control cell for corrective action. It was the responsibility of the technographers 
in each cell to ensure that templates were properly populated and saved in the correct location. 
Internal validity: Collection instruments were designed to ensure that accurate conclusions could 
be drawn from the data. To ensure their proper use during game play, specific internal validity 
issues with these instruments and the information they were designed to collect were identified 
during the Alpha and Beta tests, and were corrected prior to the start of player vignette number 
one, which occurred during the morning session on 11 September 2012. 
External validity: External validity applies predominately to the open-ended survey questions 
that were asked in the individual cell player surveys that were captured via WEB-IQ on the 
Unclassified Gaming Network (GAMENET). In order to provide quality controls on data 
collection, such as freedom from researcher bias and clarity these questions were evaluated by an 
internal focus group as part of the Alpha and Beta testing process, prior to being deployed in the 
game. 
Data Collection & Analysis Team Roles and Responsibilities 
DCAT Co-Leads: Responsible for collection strategies, information technology challenges, 
concerns with methodologies and analytic procedures, and tasked other members of the team 
with preparation of report sections and ensured compliance with requisite deadlines. The DCAT 
co-leads for the 2012 Naval Services were Dr. Hank Brightman and LT Lindsay Kaiser (USN). 
Other DCAT members who supported post-game analysis and report writing included and Ms. 
Janelle Gatchalian and CDR Parker Glasier (USN). 
 
Data Collection Lead: Accountable for data management during the game as well as post-
execution organization of files. Answered all questions regarding file structure, data 
import/export, and information.  The Collection Lead for this project was LCDR Stacey Auger 
(USN). 
 
Facilitators: Charged with management of the two player cells (BLUE cells A and B) to ensure 
that player deliverables (e.g., COA sketches, individual participant surveys, WEB-IQ threaded 
discussions, and cell outbriefs were completed on schedule. Fostered the environment for robust 
and candid player discussion, and coordinated participant inputs to ensure that conversation was 
germane to the game’s objectives and research questions. The facilitators for the NSG were Prof. 
Doug Ducharme and Col Doug Stillwell (USMC-Ret.).   
    
Technographers:  Supported player development of the COA sketches for each of the three 
vignettes, by assisting cell participants with creating their final outbriefs, displaying WEB-IQ 
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generated outputs in order to support facilitated discussion in the plenary sessions, and ensuring 
that data were properly saved in the appropriate formats and locations on the unclassified 
GAMENET for subsequent analysis. The technographers for this project were LCDR Nick 
Miller (USN), LCDR Chris Baker (USN), and Prof. Robin Babb. 
 
Ethnographers: Employed a variety of data capture techniques to record player comments and 
perspectives during game play and plenary sessions. Recorded observations in Microsoft Word 
for use in post-game analysis. The ethnographers in the Naval Services Game were CDR Clint 
Beck (USN), CDR Dave Flanagan (USN), CDR Parker Glasier (USN), LSCS Deanna Follis 
(USN), and AG1 Rodolfo Ornelas (USN). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Naval Services Game 
59 
 
Appendix G – Co-Occurrence Tables 
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Appendix H – Player-Identified Proposed Definition of Naval Force 
Aggregation 
The Naval Services Game’s purpose was to explore the challenges associated with aggregating 
naval forces in response to an emerging conflict. With this purpose in mind, players focused on 
generating new knowledge in order to develop a better understanding of force aggregation. At 
the beginning of gameplay, all participants were given definitions of key terms and concepts in 
order to ground them in a common lexicon. Developed by the Ellis Group, Figure H.1 was the 
definition of Naval Aggregation that players used to frame their discussions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure H.1- Ellis Group Definition of Naval Force Aggregation 
 
Towards the end of the game, the Ellis Group asked participants to refine the original definition. 
While this was not in scope with the game design, BLUE Cell A players developed their 
proposed definition, as seen in Figure H.2, and presented it during the final plenary session. 
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Figure H.2- Player-Identified Proposed Definition of Naval Force Aggregation 
 
